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State laws provide a variety o f  means to protect children from .self-inflicted or 
parentally-inflicted harm, In recent years, the Supreme Court has imposed stringent 
procedural requirements on/uvenile delinquency law~ In the past year, however, the Court 
has refused to extend these procedural stringencies to analogous child-protective state law~ 
This article explores generally the rationale for court application, by constitutional 
mandate, o f  procedural safeguards to a broad range o f  child-protective legislation. The 
article suggests that some criminal-procedure rights are vitally important to protect children 
and their parents from inappropriate state interventions, but that wholesale application o f  
all criminal rights, as i f  these laws were no different from criminal laws, unduly restricts 
proper application o f  these laws Guidelines for determining what criminal rights should and 
should not be applied to child-protective legislation generally are suggested. 
CRIMINAL LAW AND CHILD ABUSE 
Criminal law procedures are considered inapplicable to child abuse and neglect 
laws in many states. In proceedings in which parents may be deprived of  child 
custody for neglect or abuse (as opposed to criminal prosecution for such 
1This article was previously published, in a slightly different format, in the Michigan Law 
Review (June 1971) under the title, "Forcing Protection on Children and Their Parents: 
The Impact of Wyman v. James." 
2Associate Professor of Law, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan. B.A., 1960, 
Princeton University; M.A., 1962, Oxford University; L.L.B., 1964, Yale University. Main 
interest is family law. 
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conduct),  parents are not  guaranteed the presence of  counsel, 3 no "presumption 
of  parental  innocence" effectively favors retention of  custody by the parent 
prior to final adjudication of  abuse or neglect, 4 the burden of  proof  at the trial 
is the civil "preponderance of  the evidence" rather than the criminal standard, s 
courts may rely on confidential information to determine the existence of  
neglect or abuse without  giving confrontat ion opportunities,  6 no "self-incrimina- 
t ion right" or Fourth Amendment  "probable cause" requirement restrains courts 
from ordering pretrial physical or psychiatric examinations of  parents or 
children to determine neglect or abuse. 7 
No state legislature has acted, or, at least, has admitted to acting, 
randomly to protect  children. In all contested cases of alleged abuse or neglect, 
state laws require a court to engage in individualized inquiry. Ideally, this 
legislative command should lead a court to delve deeply into the psychological 
dynamics of  any family coming before it, and to formulate a precise diagnostic 
view of  the family against which it is possible to judge, first, whether serious 
harm is being worked on the child (though for severe physical injuries, this 
ground for psychological inquiry can be redundant),  second, whether grave risks 
would at tend removing the particular child from his otherwise harmful family, 
and third, whether t reatment  is available to be directed at this particular family 
3See Illinois Juvenile Court Act, Ch. 37, 704-5, which assures appointed counsel for a child 
but not for his parents in such proceedings; to the same effect are Massachusetts Annot. 
Laws, Ch. 119, 29; Michigan Comp. Laws 712A. 17; Mississippi Code 7185-08; New York 
Family Court Act 249, Virginia Laws 16.1-175. By contrast, California and Wisconsin 
permit, though neither state requires, appointment of counsel for parents in abuse or 
neglect proceedings. See Alameda County v. Espinoza, 243 C.A. 2d 534, 52 CaL Rptr. 
480 (1966), Wisconsin Laws 48.25 (6). 
4In 1967-68, the family courts in New York State disposed of 6347 child neglect petitions. 
Of those, 1759 children (or about 26%) were removed from their homes pending final 
disposition of the petitions (286 children - or 4.5% of the total - were removed from 
their homes before any neglect petition was filed, and the remainder were removed after a 
petition was filed). Of these 1759 children, approximately 44% remained in a "short-term 
care" detention facility, pending disposition of the neglect petition, for more than 90 
day~ See Report of New York State Family Court, 1967-68. See Sections 1021-28 of the 
New York Family Court Act providing for temporary home removal of children both 
with and without court orders. See also Massachusetts Annot. Laws, Ch. 119 39A; 
Michigan Comp. Laws 712A.15, 722.571(a), Virginia Laws 16.1-166, 16.1-194. 
SSee New York Family Court Act 1046(b) (i); Illinois Juvenile Court Act, Ch. 37 704-6; 
Maryland Laws Ch. 26, 70-18; Texas Laws Ch. 43, 2332, Wisconsin Laws 48.25. 
6See District of Columbia Code 11-15.85(b); New York Family Court Act, Ch. 37 
705-1(2); Maryland Laws Ch. 26 70-14. Other states do, however, provide full 
confrontation rights in these proceedings. See California Code 4602; Massachusetts 
Annot. Laws Ch. 119, 24, Virginia Laws 16.1-162. 
7See New York Family Court Act 251; Maryland Laws Ch. 26, 70-14; Virginia Laws 
16.1-190; Wisconsin Laws 48.24. 
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which would respond to its psychology. There is powerful support in the 
professional literature that any judgment to remove a child from his parents 
which is not thus firmly based on a clear view of family and individual dynamics 
is a wholly random intervention (Bowlby, 1965; Steele and Pollock, 1968; Terr 
and Watson, 1968; Gil, 1970). This professional view provides strong support to 
any judicial impulse toward requiring closer, more detailed attention to the 
individual characteristics of the particular family allegedly requiring state 
intervention. And for this purpose, constitutional "domestication" of court 
procedures, by imposing the "criminal label" on these proceedings, is obviously 
attractive. 
But it would be a mistake for a court simply to adopt wholesale, via the 
Constitution, this professional view of the needs for precise diagnostic 
formulations. This is not simply because a court should disbelieve professional 
claims to precision. In the hands of its most skilled practitioners, there can be 
compelling clarity and precision in the use of psychological diagnostic tools. Nor 
should a court withhold allegiance from these views simply because of the 
obvious unavailability of such skilled practitioners, particularly in the low-status, 
low-paying child-protective agencies. If imprecision is inherent in the discipline 
or in its application to child abuse and neglect cases, that can be reason for a 
court to insist on greater care through procedural strictures in order to approach 
the ultimately unattainable ideal. 
A court must, however, consider these factors as reasons to abstain from 
imposing procedural strictures because there is obviously room for a quite 
reasonable, competing judgment that some strong pressure must be exerted on 
state officials to urge removal of children. Such pressure can be necessary 
precisely because of the imprecision and low skill of state child-protective 
personnel, which can lead to wrongful withholding of state intervention. There 
may be reasons to believe that state child abuse and neglect law administrators, 
acting even under current relatively lax procedures do not intervene into families 
as often as would be desirable in order to protect children. 8 Professional 
uncer ta in ty-  either from inherent diagnostic imprecision or from unskilled 
imprecisions - c a n  as readily lead to inaction as to excessive action. Moreover, 
the invisibility of most transactions between parent and c h i l d -  particularly 
preschool children - is an intrinsic limiting factor on the possibility of any state 
intervention predicated on individualized inquiry, no matter how lax the 
standards of that inquiry (Dembitz, 1969). Thus, it is quite reasonable to assert 
that imposing added burdens on these proceedings is at least quixotic, if not 
harmful. But if there are "reasonable" arguments which a legislature can adduce 
to justify relaxed procedural standards for neglect and abuse laws, this fact 
8C~. New York Times, May 16, 1971, p. 57, col. 1. 
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merely recasts the question for the courts. Are those competing arguments 
"reasonable enough" to justify rejecting the relevance of the criminal law 
analogues to these laws? Must, instead, the competing legislative arguments be 
"compelling"? Or, are these arguments "reasonable enough" that they are 
"compelling"? 
Courts, it would seem, should resolve these questions -whe the r  criminal 
law procedures must apply to these laws, whether legislative arguments to the 
contrary must be powerfully or merely plausibly persuasive - by consulting the 
Constitution. In the mystifying argot of the law, that means, in part, reasoning 
by analogy to past decisions. But like so much constitutional litigation, the 
available analogies point in opposing directions. 
The most recent strong argument for imposing criminal procedures on 
abuse and neglect laws comes from the Supreme Court's decision in Gault. 9 That 
case imposed criminal guarantees, such as right to appointed counsel and 
confrontation of opposing witnesses in open court, in juvenile proceedings. In so 
holding, the Court jettisoned the constitutional dogma of the preceding 
half-century which had maintained that since the purpose of the delinquency 
proceedings was not to punish but instead to protect the child, criminal law 
procedural protections were not needed. More than that, so the argument went, 
those guarantees would introduce formalism and mistrust that would defeat the 
beneficent purposes of the proceedings. The Gault Court regarded this argument 
as a rhetorical pretense. It is unreal, the Court said, to claim that no punitive 
stigma accompanies an adjudication of delinquency, and even less real to pretend 
that juvenile courts have any substantial capacity to give beneficial treatment to 
those juveniles labeled and incarcerated as delinquents, w Accordingly, Gault 
held, strict procedural guarantees are required to help match the reality of the 
juvenile court with its rhetoric. 
The analogues between Gault and abuse and neglect laws are clear. 
Punitive stigma clearly accompanies a judgment that an "abusing" or "neglect- 
ing" parent should lose custody of his child, and it is quite likely that the child 
will view his removal -  however benightedly and however much precisely 
because his parents have mistreated him - as a further punishment inflicted on 
him by omnipotent parents who now choose to desert him (Freud, 1965). 
Further, the promise of beneficent treatment following home removal 
resounds hollowly against the hard reality of inadequate foster homes and 
understaffed, overcrowded long-term child detention facilities. It appears that 
the majority of  children removed from their homes are eventually returned there 
(Fanshel, 1971), and in part because few resources are available for intensive 
9In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
1o 387 U.S. at 14-31. 
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family therapy during this interim, it seems unlikely that this temporary removal 
works for the benefit either of the child or his family. From this recital, Gault 
appears to command by analogy that stringent procedural guarantees should be 
imposed on child abuse and neglect proceedings that would in effect make state 
intervention possible only in the most shocking, self-evident child abuse case. 
But there is a contrary argument available. Gault gives procedural rights to 
a juvenile whose own conduct is in question in delinquency proceedings. In 
abuse and neglect proceedings, the child is seen as the alleged victim. His parents' 
conduct is in question. It can thus be argued that constitutionally grounded 
procedural rights are withheld from the parents in order to benefit the child, to 
protect him against his parents. The Supreme Court has recently given strong 
impetus to this argument. In Wyman vs. James, 11 the Court rejected a welfare 
recipient's argument that caseworker home visits could not be made a 
compulsory part of welfare grants, unless a judicial search warrant were issued 
before each forced visit. The court ignored persuasive analogues to police 
searches in these welfare visits, and reached this result in substantial part by 
relying on the visit's "benevolent intent" and, in particular, on its alleged 
child-protective purposes. The Court stated that "the dependent child's needs 
are paramount, and only with hesitancy would we relegate those n e e d s . . ,  to a 
position secondary to what the mother claims as her rights. ''12 
The Wyman Court chose to ignore available evidence that the benevolent 
allegations of the welfare department were empty pretenses, that caseworkers 
were not viewed by welfare recipients as "friends in need" and were typically 
"badly trained or untrained" and '~young and inexperienced. ''13 The Court was 
similarly not troubled that the caseworker in the I~yman case itself had not 
asked and was not certain to see Mrs. James' child.14 The Wyman Court was 
content to assume that the visit was for the child's benefit, in the teeth of  
evidence similar to that which the Gault Court had found sufficient to disregard 
the juvenile court's protestations of benevolence and derivative claims of 
exemption from procedural stringencies. 
It can be argued that Wyman is simply retrogressive, and that Gault's 
enlightened realism should prevail to impose criminalized procedures in abuse 
and neglect proceedings. But this argument is too glib. The promises of benefit 
in many abuse and neglect cases are scant. But i s  it clear that needed help is 
never provided under these laws, or that imposition of stringent procedural 
11 400 U.S. 304 (1971). 
12 400 U.S. at 318. 
la 400 U.S. at 323. 
m See Mr. Justice Marshall's dissent, 400 U.S. at 342. 
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protections for parents would never work to withhold help from desperately 
needy children? "Better that ten guilty men go free than that one innocent be 
convicted" is the catchphrase invoked to justify stringent procedures in criminal 
cases. Is there an equivalent constitutional slogan that it is better  that ten - or 
five, or o n e -  abused children go undiscovered or unprotected so that one 
child - or five, or ten - could properly remain with his parents? Can a court 
calibrate tfiese competing risks and benefits with sufficient certainty that  it can 
justifiably override a different state legislative judgment? 
In final analysis, constitutional exegesis yields no compelling answer to the 
question whether criminal procedures must, or need not, apply to child abuse 
laws. These laws touch values toward which the Court has traditionally been 
solicitous. The closeness of  the criminal analogue in the operation of these laws 
and the hallowed status of  the parent-child relation in our society ~s cannot 
easily be overlooked. But neither can the Court ignore the potential for deeply 
hurtful abuse of authority of  parent over child that our rootless, anomic society 
most particularly affords. Wyman looks to one direction, Gault to the other. 
Neither posture is a priori compelling. 
But if it is, therefore, equally proper in logic for the Court to adopt either 
approach, it must be said that it is also equally improper that either be adopted. 
Thus the Court must - and can - seek a resolution of  the competing solutions 
which to the greatest degree possible, avoids totally subordinating one principle 
to the other, and instead, to the greatest degree possible, works an accommoda- 
tion of  both. 
FAMILIES IN THE COURTS 
A closer examination of the operation of child abuse and neglect laws 
suggests some guidelines for the Court in attempting to accommodate " i ts"  
i n t e r e s t s - i n  protecting traditional constitutional concerns in traditional 
fashion, by insisting on precise individualized judgments of  the need for state 
i n t e rven t i on -  with competing legislative interests against such attempts at 
precision. For this purpose, it will be useful to examine the New York 
legislature's experiences in 1969 and 1970, and to indulge some speculations on 
the psychological dynamics of  those experiences. 
In 1969, the legislature hastily enacted a new child abuse law in response 
to a sensationally publicized murder of  a three-year-old girl whom the New York 
Family Court had left in parental custody following a hearing on allegations of  
15 Compare Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), in which the court proclaimed 
that "'to marry, establish a home and bring up children" were fundamental constitutional 
rights. 
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abuse two months before her death. 16 This new law was essentially intended to 
remove discretion from the Family Court in order to force state intervention. 
Two principle mechanisms were designed to accomplish this: any child found 
"abused" was required by the new law to be removed from home, ~7 thus  
abrogating traditional court dispositional discretion; and any child of  an 
"adjudicated narcotics addict"  was conclusively presumed to be "abused." is 
Enactment of  this law might appear dramatically to reflect a "rescue fantasy" 
against which it is commonplace (though often ineffective) to warn individual 
caseworkers and judges who deal with abuse and neglect cases. John Bowlby 
(1965), in his classic work in separating children from parents, characterized this 
fantasy as follows (p. 140): 
So long as caseworkers do not know the limitations (in removing 
children from their homes for whatever reason), but live, as some do, in 
the sentimental glamour of saving neglected children from wicked 
parents, they will act impetuously in relieving parents of their 
responsibilities and, by their actions, convey to the parents the belief 
that the child is far better off in the care of others. Only if the 
caseworker is mature enough and trained enough to respect even bad 
parents and to balance the less-evident long-term considerations against 
the manifest and perhaps urgent short-term ones, will she help the 
parents themselves and do a good turn to the child. 
One important explanation regarding why "rescue" of  the child from his "bad"  
parents may be no help at all to the child was stated this way by Bowlby (1965, 
p. 80): 
The attachment of children to parents who, by all ordinary standards, 
are very bad is a never-ceasing source of wonder to those who seek to 
help them. Even when they are with kindly foster parents these 
children feel their roots to be in the homes where, perhaps, they have 
been neglected and ill-treated, and keenly resent criticisms dkected 
against their parents. Efforts made to 'save' the child from his bad 
surroundings and to give him new standards are commonly of no avail, 
since it is his own parents who, for good or ill, he values and with 
whom he is identified. (This is a fact of critical importance when 
considering how best to help children who are living in intolerable 
conditions) 
But just as it was difficult for the New York Legislature, and for individual 
judges and caseworkers to perceive the depth of  at tachment which a child can 
have to very bad parents, it can be equally difficult for the legislature and for 
individual judges and caseworkers to acknowledge that some, or any, parents are 
26 See Conmaittee on the Family Court and Family Law, "The Enactment of the Ab31sed 
Child Law and Committee Findings as to Defects in the Law (Laws 1969, c. 264,)" 34 
Record of the Ass'n of  the Bar of the City of N. Y. 347 (1969). 
17 Ch. 264, 1969 McKinney's Sessions Laws for New York, 1022. 
18 Id. at 1012. The New York Family Court subsequently struggled manfully to avoid this 
clear reading of the statute. See In Re John Children, 306 N.Y.S. 2d, 797 (1969). 
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in fact very bad toward their children. And in some ways, symbolic if no other, 
the 1970 action of the New York Legislature - repealing the 1969 abuse law 
and restoring full discretion to the Family Court 19 - w a s  a rapid retreat away 
from its adamant stance a year earlier that mirrors a common state response in 
individual neglect and abuse cases - that is, swift, undifferentiated removal of an 
apparently hurt child from his parents followed after some official dallying and 
confusion by a return to the status quo ante, with at least some of the 
participants in the events sadder but not wiser (Terr and Watson, 1968). 
The reasons for the possibility of misperceptions are dear, whether those 
misperceptions are an inappropriate "rescue fantasy" or a persistent refusal to 
accept the stark reality that a particular child must be removed from his parents. 
Though the explanation is easily accessible to common sense, approaching the 
matter through psychiatric terminology will be helpful (Freud, 1967; Gill, 1967; 
Schafer, 1967). In psychiatric language it is termed "counter-transference." 
In the context in which it was developed, this concept refers to the 
unconsciously derived attitudes and identifications which a therapist projects 
onto his patient. It is the natural and inescapable counterpart to the unconscious 
projections of  the patient onto the therapist, and indeed this process of 
transference/counter-transference is simply a way of describing an important 
aspect of all human interactions. For psychoanalysis, the transference concept 
has central importance, because it is the patient's transferences onto the 
therapist which become for both the central focus of the therapeutic process. 
Through identification and rational exploration of that transference, the patient 
is brought to see the  role which his unconscious is playing in affecting his 
everyday behavior, and the unconsciously motivated behavior thereby becomes 
accessible to modification. But unless the therapist's own unconscious processes, 
engaged by the patient's personality and behavior, are rationally accessible to the 
therapist, that is, unless the therapist can rationally scrutinize his counter- 
transferences, his perceptions of the patient will be hopelessly clouded by the 
interweavings of his own projections and the reality presented by the patient. 
The therapist is thereby disabled from sensibly diagnosing and pursuing a fruitful 
treatment strategy for his patient. 
The problems of counter-transference, however universal they may be to 
human relations, can be similarly disabling for sensible judicial response to child 
abuse and neglect cases. A judge's desire to punish the parents and remove their 
child, when he believes they have acted (and when in fact they have acted) 
hurtfully toward the child, can be as much or more a product of the judge's 
unconscious identifications in the transaction as his reasoned response that this 
individual child will best be helped by removal from these particular parents. 
19 Ch. 962, 1970 MeKinney's Sessions Laws for New York. 
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Similarly, the judge's convictions that this child should not be removed from 
these parents can be more a reaction to his unconscious identifications than to 
the reality presented by the abusing family. The situation has been described, 
from a psychiatrist's perspective, in this way (Steele and Pollock, 1968, p. 138): 
Probably the first difficulty met by the therapist is the management of 
his own feelings about a parent who has hurt a small baby. Most people 
react with disbelief and denial, or on the other hand, with horror and a 
surge of anger toward the abuser... (The therapist must) gain a more 
useful, neutral position . . . .  
The capacity to gain this "more useful, neutral p o s i t i o n " - t h a t  is, to 
scrutinize the fact of  the counter-transference - is a hard-won therapeutic skill 
(Schafer, 1967). It cannot be expected that most, or even many, of  those judges 
and court-affiliated personnel charged with the administration of  child abuse and 
neglect laws will have had sufficient training and  capacity to develop this skill. 
Yet without this skill, the possibility that any given judge will respond to an 
abusing family in a way that will accurately account for the child's needs and 
interests is at best wholly random, wholly dependent on the chance that this 
judge's unconsciously motivated perceptions happen to coincide with the real 
situation of  the family appearing before him. 
If it is important, and properly a constitutional concern - w h i c h ,  within 
limits, it i s -  to combat the likelihood that state officials will misperceive the 
need for intervention, there is one constitutional right which the Court might 
fruitfully put to this purpose. That would be to postulate that the parents of  an 
allegedly abused or neglected child have a right to retained or appointed counsel. 
Parental counsel would promise to be one clear voice in the proceedings with an 
unalloyed interest in combating any state intervention. This voice would in 
essense combat transference-derived fantasies that home-removal was appro- 
priate, and thus work toward providing therapeutic self-awareness for court 
personnel by insisting on the need to attend to the reality of  the individual case 
at hand. 
In some states, counsel is appointed to represent the child in these 
proceedings. 2~ But this role as spokesman for the "child's interest" forces 
cofinsel to resolve for himself - and always possibly in a manner dominated by 
his unconscious processes - whether the child's interest points to or away from 
home-removal. Counsel for the child is thus of no predictable assistance in 
forcing the administering court to confront and sort out its real as against its 
fantasy urgings to intervene in order to help the child. 
It is, of  course, true that parental counsel's insistent presence will serve to 
reinforce the court's fantasy, as opposed to real, convictions that no intervention 
is necessary. But if the judge or other administering personnel is thus inclined, it 
2~ footnote 3, p. 92. 
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seems likely that reasons for nonintervention will be found even without counsel 
to suggest them. Thus it could be reasonably concluded that the presence of 
parental counsel would materially advance a court-derived constitutional 
conce rn -  that an individualized, relatively precise judgment must precede 
removing a child from his paren t s -  without unduly jeopardizing a quite 
reasonable contrary concern that removal will be inappropriately denied because 
courts will deny the reality which they in fact confront regarding the risks of 
harm to the child. Additionally, in order to avoid reinforcing this inappropriate 
denial by administering officials, the parental right to counsel might be held 
subject to waiver, although an excellent argument can be made against 
permitting waiver of counsel in these proceedings. This is an obviously rough, far 
from precise, accommodation of the competing interests at stake. But it is an 
accommodation. 
In sum, the presence of counsel for the parents is intended to guard against 
misperceptions by administering officials. It is, however, clear that counsel's 
presence might work to forestall those officials from acting on wholly adequate 
perceptions of the need for intervention to protect the child, or might serve to 
withhold information, which would otherwise be available, on which officials 
might base an adequate judgment for intervention. This is a legitimate concern. 
But the court is entitled to insist that this legislative concern be met by 
provisions carefully tailored to it. To insist wholly on excluding counsel to meet 
this concern is to insist that the court unduly sacrifice the protection of its 
constitutionally derived interests in these proceedings. 
The legitimate legislative interest in pressing administrative officials to 
identify and protect children in need can, however, to a substantial degree be 
vindicated by ensuring that those officials have ready access to a wide range of 
information about the child and his family. The presence of a parental advocate 
might be expected to combat the punitive fantasies which might lead to 
inappropriate removal of a particular child from his parents. The presence of 
extensive information about a particular child and his family might be expected 
to combat the wishful denials of some officials that parents are ever bad to their 
children. The most sensible guideline for accommodating competing judicial and 
legislative concerns in the administration of child abuse and neglect laws would 
thus be to ensure that any decision to intervene in family life is preceded by 
searching scrutiny, but that extensive information about the family is available 
to administering officials upon which they might discern whether intervention is 
needed. 
On this ground, it would be inappropriate to extend the self-incrimination 
right to parents alleged to abuse or neglect their children when the purpose of 
the inquiry is to decide whether the child must be protected from the parent by 
home-removal or other means (Paulsen, 1966). Rather, administrative officials 
must be free to insist that parents speak fully regarding their relations with the 
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child, and officials must also be free to draw negative inferences from parental 
resistance to full disclosures. On this ground, it would also be inappropriate to 
apply stringent "probable cause" standards as a prerequisite to medical 
examinations of the child or his parents. Particularly when dealing with younger 
children, and most emphatically when dealing with preverbal children, there are 
staggering evidentiary problems in distinguishing between those conditions of 
the child (whether physical or emotional) which do and those which do not 
indicate serious impairment of parent-child relations (Dembitz, 1969). Is this 
child's skull fracture accidental, as his parents now insist, or was it inflicted in 
parental beatings? Is this child's apparently disturbed behavior the precursor of  a 
full-bloom psychopathology, which requires intervention into family inter- 
actions as early as possible, or is this behavior an attribute of a developmental 
process which will yield to "the self-healing qualities of further develop- 
m e n t . . . "  (Kris, 1958)? To make these distinctions in individual cases can be a 
complex and difficult task, even if the diagnostician has access to all conceivable 
information about the child's developmental history and his family's interactions 
with him. But without access to such information, differential diagnosis is 
impossible. 
It is true that further development of the child will necessarily reveal what 
the presenting symptom foretold. But if the child's skull fracture was a symptom 
of a pattern of parental abuse, we can hardly afford to wait for additional 
confirmation if we hope effectively to protect the child. And if the child's odd 
behavior is a precursor of more obvious psychopathology, early intervention is 
equally essential to assure the possibility of successful treatment (Freud, 1965). 
Anna Freud correctly warns that "as knowledge stands at present, it is difficult 
to draw the line between prediction of pathology based on authentic danger 
signals, and a diffuse and indiscriminate over-anxiousness, all too easily aroused 
by every slight deviation from the optimal and from the norm." (Freud, 1965). 
It is equally true that the personnel who administer child abuse and neglect laws 
are even more likely than Miss Freud to have difficulty in drawing this line. But 
these facts do not justify withholding from diagnostic personnel the access to 
information upon which informed judgments might be based. It is tempting to 
forbid access to information as a prophylaxis against possible (or even probable) 
misuse of that information. But to embrace this rule as a constitutional principle 
is to deny the possibility that the child-protective agencies can ever improve 
their capacities to match performance and promise. To embrace this rule as a 
constitutional principle would meet the Court's concern to protect traditional 
values, but would unduly subordinate the legitimate interests expressed in a 
competing legislative judgment favoring early intervention to protect children. 2~ 
21 Compare In re Vulon Children, 56 Misc. 2d 19, 288 NYS2d 203 (1968). 
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The accommodation urged here - that widest access of information be 
assured to assist in identifying child abuse or neglect, but that rigorous scrutiny 
be directed at any conclusions derived from that information in part by assuring 
the active participation of parental counsel - m i g h t  appear in some degree in 
conflict when considering what kind of confrontation rights will be afforded in 
abuse or neglect proceedings. Two objections can be raised against the 
proposition that all witnesses favoring state intervention must testify in open 
court, and be fully available for cross-examination. First, it can be argued that 
confidence must be guaranteed to .assure either that private citizens will readily 
report child abuse or neglect incidents or that professional personnel will speak 
and write freely about the case. But such speculative gains from assuring 
anonymity, and the substantial likelihood that anonymity in a number of cases 
will merely mask spitefulness or incompetence, are clearly outweighed by the 
interest in full examination of the judgmental bases for removing a child from 
his parents or otherwise significantly intervening in the family. Second, it can be 
argued that public exposure of medical or psychiatric data might interfere with 
the prospects of subsequent treatment for the child or his parents. This is a 
substantial concern, but it can be accommodated on a case-by-case basis by 
insisting that a court be clearly convinced of the reality of therapeutic needs for 
nondisclosure.22 
The general rule must, however, favor application of the constitutional 
rights to full confrontation in open court, and such confrontation must be 
provided at both the adjudicative and dispositional stages of child abuse and 
neglect proceedings. The constitutional confrontation guarantees, as applied in 
criminal proceedings, are at present limited to the "adjudicative" trial and have 
not yet been extended to sentencing proceedings to assure access, for example, 
to presentence reports (Remington e t  al . ,  1969). Whatever the sense of this 
limitation in criminal "disposition" proceedings, it is based on the logic that an 
adjudication that a person has committed a criminal act renders him subject to 
whatever variety of state intervention purposes -  punishment, deterrence, 
rehabilitation - the state might see fit to pursue. But for child abuse and neglect 
proceedings, it is inconsistent with the internal logic of state laws completely to 
compartmentalize adjudication and disposition. The professed state purpose is to 
protect the child, and that purpose cannot be implemented unless the state can 
comparatively evaluate the parental misconduct and its potential harmfulness to 
the child with the available dispositional alternatives and their potential 
harmfulness to the child. The unanimous outcry against and rapid abandonment 
of the 1969 New York heresy - which automatically linked home-removal with 
a finding of parental misconduct - demonstrates that state laws generally accept 
22 See ln  re Blaine, 54 Misc. 2d 248, 282 N.Y.S. 2d 359 (1967). 
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this premise (though they do not always put it into effective operation). The 
state abuse and neglect laws should betaken at their face on this matter, and 
should not be permitted to distinguish between adjudication and disposition 
proceedings for purposes of assuring confrontation rights. 
T H E  GA UL T DECISION 
The discussion thus far compels re-examination of the Supreme Court's 
reasoning in Gault. If it is wrong for a court wholly to ignore the possible 
benefits for children in abuse and neglect proceedings that might be impeded by 
application of stringent procedures, it would be equally wrong to ignore these 
benefits and the possible harm of procedural impediments in delinquency 
proceedings. 
There are compelling similarities between the operational contexts of 
neglect and delinquency laws. There is, first of all, considerable overlap between 
them in terms of the coercive jurisdiction each confers. The same acts which can 
establish a delinquency adjudication can also quite readily establish parental 
neglect, essentially for failure to exercise proper guidance and control as 
evidenced by the child's delinquent actions. The juvenile can be placed in the 
state's custody either as a "delinquent" or as a "neglected" child. Thus, for 
example, if a child must be given self-incrimination rights to protect himself 
against state coercion for delinquent acts, he must equally be shielded from 
"self-incrimination" in the operation of neglect and abuse laws which simply 
overlap delinquency laws. But if the criminal self-incrimination rights for the 
child are carried wholesale into abuse and neglect proceedings, and accompanied 
by the ordinary rule that any waiver must be "knowing and intelligent, ''23 it is 
evident that court personnel could never interview a young child alleged to be 
neglected or abused. This consequence is inappropriately constrictive of 
legitimate state policy. Too much information, needed to protect the child, 
would be withheld from the state. This is the same reason, discussed earlier, that 
led to the conclusion that self-incrimination rights should be withheld from 
parents in neglect and abuse proceedings where child custody alone was at issue. 
There is a further related reason that the self-incrimination right cannot 
appropriately be granted to young children who are subject to child abuse or 
neglect proceedings. The right must be withheld not because there is no 
"sanction" or "stigma" at stake for the child in these proceedings; as noted 
earlier, from the child's perspective at least the "remedy" of removal from his 
parents, however bad they may be, can quite readily appear as a desperately 
23Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966). 
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harsh punishment. Withholding the right follows, rather, from the proposition 
that the child cannot be expected to have sufficient capacity to choose between 
his loyalties to his parents and his personal need to be free from their 
mistreatment. The purpose of state intervention must be, first, to determine 
whether the child does in fact need to be free and, if so, to help him successfully 
get free. For this purpose, state officials must have access to the child - to both 
permit and support disloyalty to his parents when such disloyalty is necessary 
for the child's good. A preschool child, in particular, is peculiarly incapacitated 
to free himself from belief in his parents' omnipotence. He is both psycho- 
logically and practically utterly dependent (though not without influence within 
the family) (Freud, 1965). For this reason, it would be wrong to insist as a 
matter of  constitutional principle that the preschool child must be given some 
independent role in withholding permission from the state to intervene in his life 
for his welfare. The grant of such independent role, as the Gaul t  Court explicitly 
acknowledged, is at base the purpose of the constitutional guarantee against 
self-incrimination. 24 
With increasing age, and increasing experience outside the home, a child 
comes more fully and realistically to understand that he need not simply be 
acted upon by his environment, including his parental environment, but that he 
can be a self-willed actor and influence in that environment. With that growing 
understanding comes growing capacity to make independent choices of the kind 
which the self-incrimination right is intended to protect. Some delinquent 
behavior is, however, symptomatic of disturbances in this growth process. It 
cannot be said that all behavior which the community regards as "delinquent" is 
thus symptomatic. Nor can the delinquent behavior which is thus symptomatic 
be precisely quantified or readily identified at the moment a particular child 
comes to the attention of state authorities. But where delinquent behavior does 
connote this disturbance, it equally can connote an incapacity to exercise the 
self-incrimination right. That is, for some young and adolescent children, 
delinquent behavior derives from family disturbances which place the child in a 
bind quite similar to abuse or neglect proceedings (Freud, 1964). 
This older child "knows" that he needs help and, in particular, that he 
needs release from an environment which makes intolerable demands on him. 
Yet he cannot consciously acknowledge his need for help because the psychic 
cost of admitting the shortcomings of his environment, and the hurtfulness of 
his parents toward him, seems devastating. To give this child clear, unambiguous 
power to resist state intervent ion-  a power which the right against self- 
incrimination is intended to confer - is often virtually to assure that neither he 
nor anyone else will be able to acknowledge his need for help. Giving this child 
24 In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 47. 
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such power may be to abandon him to a fate that neither he nor the community 
wants. For this child, delinquency proceedings are as much a contest between his 
parents and state agencies-  however muted and disguised that contest may 
appear for an older child himself accused of bad conduct - as are child abuse 
and neglect proceedings. And this child is as little able effectively to protect 
himself either against his parents or the state as the child subject to abuse or 
neglect proceedings (Katz, 1969). 
This characterization clearly does not apply to all juvenile delinquency 
proceedings. Before Gault, state agencies acted as if this were a universal 
description. Gault argued, however, that the criminal analogue was so dose, and 
the promise of benefit so uncertain that certain constitutional guarantees must 
be applied to  delinquency proceedings as if children were adults. But if, in a 
rough way, this was Gault's instruction, that instruction is elusively oracular. For 
even when dealing with adults, the state has reserved much power to coerce an 
adult for his "best interest" and to withhold constitutional protections from 
adults found incompetent to exercise them (Katz, 1969). Unless Gault means 
that all children must be treated like adults - regardless of the state's view of 
their capacities or need for coerced assistance - the Gault instruction gives little 
clear direction. 
The technique for accommodating the competing demands of the criminal 
and civil procedural models, described earlier for child abuse and neglect laws, 
can be easily applied to justify all but one of the specific procedural rights 
conferred by the Gault Court and subsequent Supreme Court action. Just as in 
abuse and neglect laws, Gault's insistence on appointed counsel to represent the 
child, on clear advance notice, and on confrontation of all witnesses at the 
delinquency hearing are essential to ensure a rigorous testing of the basis of any 
claim for beneficial state intervention. The recent extension of Gault to require 
proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" in delinquency proceedings 2s is similarly 
justifiable. And, for the reasons discussed regarding abuse and neglect laws, it 
would be wrong to limit these procedural rights to those proceedings in which 
the child is charged with conduct which, for an adult, would be a crime. For 
whatever reason the state chooses to force assistance on an unwilling juvenile, 
these procedural guarantees are essential to assure a reasonable likelihood that 
benefit will result, and thus to justify the withholding of whatever other criminal 
procedure guarantees the state might properly consider to interfere with its 
beneficial purposes. 
But Gault's bestowal of the right against self-incrimination in delinquency 
proceedings raises more complex questions. Gault, moreover, insisted that 
2s In re ICinship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
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Miranda  26 also applied in full force to the delinquency proceedings, 27 so that 
the right to appointed counsel came to the juvenile at his earliest contact with state 
authorities. If we ignore for the moment the likely practical consequences of this 
bestowal of self-incrimination rights, and focus rather on the idealized imagery 
which shines through the Court's opinions, the juvenile will be warned at the 
moment state officials contact him that he need not speak and that he can have 
appointed counsel. If he chooses either to remain silent or to have counsel, all 
further private communication between the juvenile and court personnel will 
end. Moreover, the slightest hesitation by the juvenile in response to the Miranda  
warnings will be construed as an invocation of the rights to silence and to an 
attorney. In short, private conversation between the juvenile and court personnel 
about the juvenile's alleged actions will be impossible unless eagerly initiated by 
the juvenile himself. 
If this image were the practical reality, it would obviously make it 
impossible for the state to make contact with, and effectively offer assistance to, 
that class of  juveniles described earlier as lacking capacity for exercising the 
self-incrimination right. These juveniles' inability to acknowledge their need for 
release from their present environment, their incapacity to ask for help by 
"choosing to confess," can only be remedied by confidential, confidence-giving, 
prodding, and thus subtly coercive conversation with empathetic, well-trained 
court, personnel (Schafer, 1959). Conferring the self-incrimination right can 
mean that these juveniles will be lost to whatever help the state might offer, just 
as provision of the self-incrimination right in child abuse and neglect proceedings 
would make it prohibitively difficult to develop information by which the 
child's need for protection could be identified. On what basis did the Court 
override a contrary legislative judgment that it was more important to have 
access to these juveniles than to give the self-incrimination protection to others? 
The Gaul t  Court appears to adopt three arguments- f i rs t ,  that little 
benefit is in fact likely to come to any juvenile from the staff and facilities 
currently available; second, that privately induced confessions are likely to be 
antitherapeutic when followed by coercive sanction; and third, that many 
juvenile "confessions" are in fact notoriously unreliable. 28 The Court's second 
argument has particular strength. While it is true that granting power to many 
youths to forestall state intervention can disable them from asking the help they 
need, it is also true that withholding power to resist intervention can be equally 
26Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
387 U.S. at 26, 55. 
28 See 387 U.S. at 21-23, 51-55. 
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destructive of therapeutic goals. If help is seen as merely forced, rather than 
asked and needed, the coerced youth is likely to lock himself into a power 
struggle with yet another hostile environment. Any known therapeutic tech- 
nique for changing self-destructive delinquent behavior cannot succeed unless 
the active collaboration and cooperation of the youth himself is secured 
(Council of Am. Psychiat. Assoc., 1967; Katz, 1969). Thus, if the Court is 
concerned to ensure that the reality of therapeutic benefit match its promise in 
juvenile dispositions, its most reliable ultimate indicator is the willingness of the 
juvenile to accept the offered treatment. Guaranteeing the right against 
self-incrimination can effectively serve this end. 
But however true all of the Court's arguments may be, they do not 
establish that the formal imagery of the self-incrimination guarantee should be 
imposed in an effort to keep court personnel always at arms' length from an 
alleged delinquent juvenile. Rather, a more finely tuned adjustment of 
competing goals could be made by permitting early and extensive staff access to 
the juvenile, but greatly restricting subsequent uses of the "fruit" of that early 
access. This alternative formulation is not necessarily inconsistent with Gault. It 
is not, however, clearly envisioned or invited by the Court, but instead is 
discouraged. Under Gault, court personnel could refuse to permit a juvenile 
access to an attorney, and question him at length, so long as they are willing to 
be disabled, by the exclusionary rule, from later using any information thus 
gathered to impose an unwanted disposition on the juvenile. The dogma of the 
exclusionary rule is such, however, that any self-respecting court official could 
not admit using it in this way. Rather, the exclusionary rule is supposed to 
operate as an incentive to "do good," and as the Gault Court appears to have 
defined "good" in this context, it is that court officials should not have easy 
access to uncounseled juveniles. 
The Court should have attempted to apply the self-incrimination guarantee 
to juvenile court proceedings in a way which would not disable court personnel 
from exerting confidential pressure against a juvenile who could not Otherwise 
be helped, and yet which would forestall the abuses to which this easy access 
might be put. The technique for doing this was obviously at hand, if the Court 
simply were to have viewed the exclusionary rule as granting permission for 
denying the right to silence and to counsel, rather than as a device to ensure that 
these rights were never denied. By this means, the Gault Court could have 
acknowledged the quite legitimate state interest in securing confidential access 
to juveniles in order to persuade them to accept treatment, while protecting the 
countervailing interest of the resisting juvenile by ensuring that if state 
persuasion fails, the information gathered during the confidential interviews 
could not be used to coerce the juvenile into an unwilled treatment. If the 
process of state persuasion fails, we have a quite reliable indicator that little 
good is likely to come to the juvenile from state intervention (though punitive 
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intervention to protect the community may still obviously be warranted). But if, 
as is the case under Gault, the state is deprived of an easy and openly 
acknowledged opportunity to persuade the juvenile to accept treatment, we 
cannot be certain that all who might have benefited from whatever therapeutic 
treatment was available would in fact have been identified. It is clear, as Gault 
posits, that the state and many juveniles are likely adversaries in delinquency 
proceedings. It is not clear that all juveniles must be so regarded from the 
beginning of their encounter with the state. 
The exclusionary rule, by demanding suppression of all "fruits of the 
poisonous tree," can operate so that the state is unlikely to have any coercive 
hold on a juvenile who is confidentially questioned and resists later cooperation 
(Pitier, 1968). State officials would be unwilling to run this risk for some 
juveniles who have allegedly committed offenses which are gravely injurious to 
others or greatly offensive to the community. But for such juveniles, court 
officials would obviously be free - under the more permissive reading of the 
Gault exclusionary rule which is suggested h e r e -  to forego their option for 
confidential persuasion, and to deal with the juvenile at arms' length from the 
first encounter. The confidential persuasion option would most likely be 
exercised in those cases where it is not clearly essential for community safety 
that the juvenile be detained against his will. Casual "joy-riding" car theft, minor 
narcotics offenses, petty property thefts, or minor assaults among acquaintances 
are likely examples, in addition to such "noncriminal" offenses as truancy or 
"being habitually beyond parental control." Such matters are the great bulk of 
the jurisdiction of juvenile courts in this country (Morris and Hawkins, 1969). 
The preceding discussion speaks to the idealized imagery of Gault. In its 
practical impact, however, it is clear that much room is left for coercive pressure 
against juveniles because Gault held that the juvenile could waive his right to 
silence without any prior advice from counsel, his parents, or any third party. 29 
This waiver possibility permits police, or other juvenile court officials, to effect 
rapid, low-visibility coercions, and thereby confidentially to interrogate. 3~ But 
court officials cannot openly, honestly, and unashamedly interrogate. Gault thus 
preserves nothing of benefit for the juvenile but only assures opportunity for 
abuse. The sensible benefits from "pressure to confess" exerted on a juvenile can 
come only if some time can be spent in relatively relaxed confidential 
communication where resistances can be explored, contradictions in attitudes 
387 U.S. a t55 .  
3O 
'See Note, "Interrogation in New Haven: The impact of Miranda." Yale Law J. 7 6 : I 5 1 9  
(1967); Note, "A postscript to the Miranda project: Interrogation of Draft Protesters." 
YaleLawZ 77:300 (1967). 
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can be identified, and confidences can be built. Gault does not invite this 
opportunity. 
But Gault does hold open the possibility for state legislature to remedy its 
failure clearly to legitimate early confidential access to juveniles by court 
officials. State legislatures can adopt immunity statutes for juvenile court 
proceedings-as  frequently has been done for adult criminal proceed- 
ings 3~ - w h i c h  can permit court officials to require that a juvenile forego his 
rights to silence and to counsel during questioning in return for immunity from 
prosecution for the offense about which the juvenile is questioned. Though such 
statute for juveniles might appear impolitically "soft on delinquents," it would 
respond to the reality that coercive sanctions against juveniles are unlikely to. 
have therapeutic benefit. But precisely because of the public unpopularity of 
this stance, it is unfortunate that the Court did not understand the need to 
legitimate such conduct by juvenile court authorities rather than leaving the 
question to state legislative action. 
THE WYMAN DECISION 
Gault erred by discounting the beneficial uses of coercion. Wyman, in 
refusing any procedural safeguards to ensure that welfare home visits would have 
some beneficial purpose, erred more egregiously by ignoring the potential for 
abuses in coercion. The Wyman Court should have imposed a warrant 
requirement to give contemporary vindication to the traditional personal privacy 
values of the Fourth Amendment. 3~ But, as with abuse and neglect laws and 
delinquency laws, the Court should not have applied the constitutional warrant 
requirement wholesale to the welfare home visit. To do so would unduly impede 
a legitimate beneficent purpose of that visit. If  the Fourth Amendment is 
automatically applied, no warrant could be issued unless welfare officials first 
showed that they had "probable c a u s e " - t h a t  is, highly persuasive and 
individualized p r o o f - t o  support the necessity for the visit. Thus, if a 
caseworker sought a warrant based on a belief that a welfare parent was abusing 
her child, the caseworker would need to support this belief with compelling 
evidence. This application of the "probable cause" standard would restrict 
31 See Note, "State immunity statutes in constitutional perspective." Duke Law J. 311 
(1968); Note, "Immunity statutes and the Constitution." Colum. Law Rev. 68:959 (1968). 
32 The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution provides this: "The right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be seized." 
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investigations as sharply, and as much to the detriment of children, as would 
application of this standard to preliminary examinations in child abuse and 
neglect proceedings. Relations between parents and, in particular, preschool 
children have too little ready visibility to expect that children can be adequately 
protected by generally requiring "probable cause" to believe injury before state 
authorities can examine children or their parents against the parents' will. 
The argument for a lower proof standard for state child protective 
purposes is not derived from anything peculiar to the welfare program. Rather 
the argument is drawn from considering the needs of state child-protective 
programs generally. It is true, however, that child-protective programs are most 
rigorously carried out against welfare recipients, and thus a rule which generally 
permits easy state investigation o f  parent-child relationships will fall with 
particular force on welfare families. There is some slight reason to believe that 
welfare families as a group, for whatever cause, are more likely than other 
families to warrant state intervention to protect young children (Gil, 1970, pp. 
112-114, 139). But this evidence is not strong enough to establish compellingly 
persuasive differences between welfare and other families. The state could not 
satisfy a substantial burden of proof in order to justify concentrating its 
child-protective investigators on welfare families, if this showing were required. 
But would a court be justified in imposing such a proof burden in this 
matter? The consequences of such burden would be that the state could avoid a 
"probable cause" showing for child-protective investigations only when its 
investigations were randomly distributed throughout its population or, of 
course, covered all of its population. The predictive tools for identifying children 
in need of protection from their parents for whatever reason are utterly 
inadequate to justify preselecting any segment of the population for special 
attention (Gil, 1970, pp. 125-132 and Chap. II). It might be argued that this 
court demand for perfection would in fact not interfere with any legitimate state 
purpose on the ground that any deployment of its child-protective investigators 
is essentially random, whether focused on welfare families or elsewhere, and thus 
the same number of children needing protection is likely to be found wherever 
state investigators look. But this argument ignores the fact that there is already a 
welfare bureaucracy staffed with investigators who have regular contact for 
many purposes with an identifiable clientele. This investigative staff cannot be 
diverted to random checks of all families for child-protective purposes. If a court 
were to require such randomization as the price for avoiding a "probable cause" 
barrier, the option would not likely be pursued by any state agency. And thus 
there would be a net loss of children in need of care who would in practice be 
found. 
All of those "lost" children would be from welfare families. But is it not 
clear that the interests of welfare recipients generally in resisting empirically 
unsupported, and to some degree stigmatizing, state identification as peculiarly 
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"chi ld-neglec t -prone"  should outweigh  the interests  o f  those needy children 
among them in securing pro tec t ion  f rom harmful  parents.  The interests  o f  bo th  
welfare recipients and needy welfare children are substantial  and are in confl ict .  
The Wyman  Court  s imply neglected the parents '  interests and op ted  for the 
interests o f  the children. A more persuasive resolut ion here - as elsewhere in the 
mat ters  discussed by  this article - is to media te  the  confl ic t ing interests. 
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